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Discharge or modification of leasehold covenants 
 
There are a number of ways of dealing with a restrictive covenant affecting land where the 
person subject to the covenant wishes to have it discharged or modified. It may be possible to 
negotiate the discharge or modification with the person who has the benefit of the covenant, or 
it may be possible to obtain indemnity insurance to protect against the risk of the covenant 
being enforced. If neither of these options is possible or indeed suitable then section 84 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 allows a person with an interest in land to make an application to 
the Upper Tribunal (Lands Tribunal) for a restrictive covenant to be discharged or modified. 
Jurisdiction to authorise the modification or discharge is conferred on the Tribunal by the 
Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.1 Whilst this right under s.84 is well known in 
relation to freehold land, it is often overlooked in relation to leasehold land and a recent 
decision of the Upper Tribunal, whilst not establishing any new law, acts as a reminder of the 
Upper Tribunal’s powers in this respect.  
 
The right to apply to the Upper Tribunal applies to leasehold land let for a term of more than 
forty years of which twenty-five years or more have expired.2 The twenty-five years must run 
from the actual date that the lease was granted and not from any earlier date from which it may 
have been expressed to run. In Earl of Cadogan v Guinness3 the lease had been executed on 
31st January 1888 but was expressed to commence on 25th March 1874 and to run for ninety-
nine years. As the lease had been created fourteen years after the date on which it was stated 
to commence, it was for a term of eighty-five years, not ninety-nine years. This meant that at 
the time of the relevant application under s.84 the relevant number of years, which at that time 
was fifty years, had not expired and the application failed.4 The requirement that twenty-five 
years must have expired can mean that where a qualifying lease is replaced by a new lease, for 
example on a lease-back in the course of collective enfranchisement, the leaseholder’s accrued 
right to apply to the Upper Tribunal is lost for a further 25 years.5 
 
The Upper Tribunal has recently considered the modification of a user covenant in a long lease 
in Shaviram Normandy Ltd v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council6 and confirmed that no 
special considerations apply to the exercise of its discretion in relation to leasehold covenants. 
 
The case involved Normandy House an early 1980s purpose built office building of over 
76,000 sq ft in the centre of Basingstoke near to the railway station. The freehold of the building 
is owned by Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council which on 29 March 1985 had granted a 
headlease to Greytown Investments Ltd for a term of 150 years. The headlease included a 
covenant at clause 2(15) as follows which restricted the use of the building to offices only: 
 
“ … to use the Demised Premises only as a building of the type specified in Class II in the 
Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1972 as defined in Section 2 
thereof and amenities and purposes ancillary thereto.”7 
                                                 
1 As to procedure, see the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600).  
2 Law of Property Act 1925 s.84(12). 
3 Earl of Cadogan v Guinness [1936] Ch. 515. 
4 The requirement that there be fifty years of unexpired residue was reduced to twenty five years by Landlord 
and Tenant Act 1954 s.52(1). 
5 See for example Midhage v 60 Coolhurst Road Ltd [2008] L.&T.R. 206. 
6 Shaviram Normandy Ltd v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council [2019] UKUT 256 (LC). 
7 Class II of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1972 (SI 1972/1385) refers to office use. This 
is now Class B1 in Part B of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (SI 
 
The lease also reserved an annual rent equal to 15.5% of the “aggregate of the net annual rents 
... actually received by the lessee”. 
 
The building was formerly part of the UK headquarters of IBM which occupied it from 1985 
until 2013 under an underlease which expired on 25 December 2014. After IBM vacated the 
building it had been vacant and had been allowed to fall into a state of significant disrepair, 
accelerated by vandalism. 
 
In May 2015 the headlease was acquired by Shaviram Normandy Ltd which wanted to convert 
the building into a residential apartment block with 114 residential flats, to be let on assured 
shorthold tenancies at open market rents. The purchase price was £5.25 million plus £1.05 
million VAT. 
 
The conversion of the building to residential use was permitted under Class O of the Town and 
Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 20158 without the need 
for express planning permission. However, residential use would still be in breach of the 
restriction on use in the headlease. The council as head landlord refused consent to the change 
of use and the leaseholder applied to the Upper Tribunal to vary the restriction in the lease. 
 
The main ground on which the leaseholder relied was s.84(1)(aa). This applies where, in the 
circumstances set out in s.84(1A), the continued existence of the restriction would impede 
some reasonable use of the land for public or private purposes. The parties agreed that the use 
of the building for residential purposes would be a reasonable use and that this use was impeded 
by the covenants in the headlease. The issue in dispute was therefore in relation to the 
conditions in s.84(1A). These required the Upper Tribunal to be satisfied that the restriction, 
in impeding the use of the building for residential use, did not secure to the council any practical 
benefits of substantial value or advantage to them and that money would be an adequate 
compensation for the loss or disadvantage, if any, which the council would suffer from the 
discharge. 
 
The council argued that, where the restrictions to be modified are set out in a long lease and 
the objections come from the reversioner, the Upper Tribunal should be particularly cautious 
in exercising its discretion under s.84. The Upper Tribunal considered whether leasehold 
interests should be special cases.9 It confirmed that it was clearly correct that in s.84(12) 
Parliament has recognised the special position of landlords and afforded them protection not 
available to freehold covenantees. The covenants in a lease granted for a term of 40 years or 
less are outside the scope of s.84 altogether, and no application may be made for the first 25 
years of a term of longer than 40 years. But beyond that there are no separate conditions for 
leasehold covenants. 
 
The nature of an objector’s interest was always a relevant consideration in an application under 
s.84(1), all of which turn on their own facts and on the impact which the proposed modification 
or discharge will have on the enjoyment by others of their own property. While the landlord of 
                                                 
1987/764 (though the Upper Tribunal in para 18 of the judgment referred to it as now being Class B1 in Part 3 of 
the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013/1101)). 
8 See Schedule 2 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 
(SI 2015/596). 
9 See paras 16 and 17, Shaviram Normandy Ltd v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council [2019] UKUT 256 
(LC). 
an extensive estate whose reversion will come in hand in the short or medium term had obvious 
estate management concerns to protect, the Upper Tribunal did not see why, in principle, the 
interest of a landlord should necessarily be more deserving of protection than that of a 
neighbouring owner or other person having the benefit of a restriction. It would all depend on 
the facts, and on the practical consequences of the suggested change. 
 
In particular, the Upper Tribunal felt that it would be relevant in a leasehold case to consider 
the length of the unexpired term, the rent receivable, the other obligations owed by the 
leaseholder, the extent of the landlord’s interests in any neighbouring land, and how all of those 
matters might be affected by the modification. Those factors would all be weighed up in 
addressing the statutory grounds of application before any question of discretion arose. If one 
of the statutory grounds was established the Upper Tribunal would then acquire jurisdiction 
and would then have to consider whether and how to exercise it. The Upper Tribunal said that 
it would expect it to be an unusual case in which a landlord’s preference for preserving the 
character of its reversion justified refusal on a discretionary basis when the considerations 
underpinning that preference had not been judged strong enough to defeat the claim on 
substantive grounds.  
 
The Upper Tribunal allowed the application for variation. It concluded that the restriction in 
the lease impeded the reasonable use of the building for residential purposes and it conferred 
no practical benefit of substantial value on the council. In reaching its decision the Upper 
Tribunal took into account the development plan10 and the pattern for the grant or refusal of 
planning permission in the area. 
 
The continuation of the restriction on the use of the building as offices secured no benefit to 
the council in relation to the capital value of the reversion. While the restriction secured a 
slightly higher annual income for the council, the receipt of any rent over the lifetime of the 
headlease was subject to risks. These risks were reflected in the yields of 5% for residential 
use and 6% for offices and were fully reflected in the resulting capital values of the reversion.11 
The Upper Tribunal also decided that there were no other benefits of substantial advantage to 
the council in enabling it to require continued office use. 
 
The lease also contained in clause 2(12)(b) a requirement that every subletting of part of the 
building be on terms, including a full market rent, approved in advance by the landlord. The 
leaseholder sought modification of this so that it would not have to obtain the council’s consent 
before each residential letting of any part of the building at a full market rent without a fine or 
premium for a term of up to three years. The leaseholder relied on s84(1)(a) on the basis that 
the restriction was obsolete due to changes in the character of the building or the 
neighbourhood or other circumstances which the Upper Tribunal may deem material. 
 
The Upper Tribunal did not agree and was not satisfied that a covenant, the effect of which is 
to require consent to the terms and rent of a proposed underletting before that underletting can 
proceed, but which is subject to the proviso that consent cannot be unreasonably withheld or 
delayed, is a restriction “as to the user” of the land in question (as it must be for the Tribunal 
to have jurisdiction under s.84(1)). The Upper Tribunal did not accept that the requirement was 
obsolete, in the sense that it no longer served the purpose for which it was intended if the 
building is in residential occupation. The purpose of the relevant portion of clause 2(12)(b) was 
                                                 
10 Which sets out the council’s policies and proposals for the development and use of land in their area. 
11 See para 99, Shaviram Normandy Ltd v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council [2019] UKUT 256 (LC). 
to provide reassurance to the council that it was not prejudiced by the terms of any letting and 
to enable it to be satisfied that a full market rent (in which it will share) is being charged. 
Mutual self-interest was not considered sufficient to provide that comfort when the building 
was to be restricted to office use, and the wider use being permitted did not change that. It was 
felt that the parties would be able to agree standard terms of letting, and the council may or 
may not wish in practice to concern itself with the identity of individual sub-tenants, but it is 
likely to take an interest in the rent being charged and it was entitled to do so. 
 
This part of the decision can be contrasted with Re Lee’s Application12 where an application 
for the discharge or modification of an absolute covenant against subletting was refused. The 
applicant was the leaseholder of a flat that was one of 31 flats in a 1930s block on the sea-front 
in Hove. The lease of the flat was originally granted for a term of 125 years from 1 January 
1973, but the term was later extended to 215 years.13 The applicant went to work in Australia 
but intended to resume living at the flat on his return. In the meantime he decided to let the flat 
on an assured shorthold tenancy. The lease contained a covenant on the part of the leaseholder 
not “at any time during the term hereby granted to underlet or permit the flat to be underlet”. 
The leaseholder sought the discharge of this covenant or alternatively its modification by the 
addition at the end of it of the words “save with the prior consent in writing of the Lessor, such 
consent not to be unreasonably withheld”. He relied on ground (aa) in s.84(1). The lease also 
contained a covenant by the leaseholder not “to use or occupy the Flat otherwise than as a 
private residence for the sole occupation of the Tenant and his family and in particular not to 
use the Flat or any part thereof for the purposes of any business defined by Section 23(2) of 
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 or any statute amending or re-enacting the same.” The 
leaseholder sought to modify this by the substitution of “the Tenant and” with the words “either 
the Tenant or any lawful sublessee and that person's”.14 
 
The applicant conceded that the fact that letting was prohibited in a block of flats could be seen 
as securing a substantial advantage. His case for modifying the restriction was based on the 
fact that the prohibition on subletting had already been formally modified in nine other flats in 
the block. However, in respect of two of the flats (one of which was not at the time sublet) it 
was quite clear that they could be sublet; but in respect of the other seven, the restriction on 
subletting had been removed, though it could be argued that the user clause still required 
occupation by the leaseholder. 
 
The Upper Tribunal took the view that four of these leases still precluded subletting, but three 
did not, though the position with regard to the latter was not wholly clear. The ability to prevent 
an additional flat being sublet was nevertheless a practical benefit of substantial value to the 
company, whether or not it was unable to prevent the subletting of up to five other flats. The 
application was therefore dismissed. 
 
It should also be noted that the Upper Tribunal took the view that, even if ground (aa) had not 
been made out, it would be difficult for the leaseholder to make a case that it should exercise 
its discretion in his favour. The leaseholder had flagrantly disregarded the terms of his lease, 
which called into question whether he would observe the terms of any modified covenant. He 
had sought permission to sublet, and this had been refused; but despite this he went ahead and 
granted a sublease. Moreover, after the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal had determined that he 
                                                 
12 Re Lee’s Application [2012] UKUT 125 (LC). 
13 By virtue of a deed of variation and supplemental lease made pursuant to s.56 of the Leasehold Reform, 
Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. 
14 Though perhaps the words to be substituted should have been “the Tenant and his”. 
was in breach of covenant in doing this he granted a further sublease. But, as he had not made 
out ground (aa), the question of how the Upper Tribunal should exercise its discretion did not 
arise. 
 
Section 84 does not apply to positive covenants.15 The Court of Appeal considered whether a 
covenant was positive or restrictive for the purpose of s.84 in Blumenthal v Church 
Commissioners for England.16 The case involved the grant of a headlease of a large house in 
Paddington in 1951. The intention was that the leaseholder was to convert the property after 
the headlease had been granted and sub-let it. Consequently the headlease contained various 
covenants specifying that certain parts of the property had to occupied by the Royal Society of 
Literature17 together with accommodation for their housekeeper. A sublease was subsequently 
granted to the Royal Society of Literature. When this came to an end the leaseholder obtained 
a variation of the covenants to allow for residential occupation of the part of the property 
formerly occupied by the Royal Society of Literature. This variation also allowed part of the 
housekeeper’s accommodation in the basement to be used for residential occupation. In 2001 
the leaseholder then applied to the Lands Tribunal18 to modify the lease so that the whole of 
the basement could be used for residential occupation. 
 
The landlord argued that the covenants were positive covenants, not restrictive covenants, and 
so could not be modified under s.84. The leaseholder argued that if the covenants were positive 
then it would lead to an unreasonable result in that at the end of the sublease, the leaseholder 
would have been in breach of covenant, which the parties could not have intended. 
 
The Court of Appeal decided that each covenant had to be construed in the context of the 
particular lease. The covenants had originally been included in the headlease to make sure that 
a respectable tenant occupied the property. It was not right to construe the covenants as a 
positive obligation rendering the leaseholder liable to find himself in breach of covenant in 
circumstances which he had no power to prevent. If the parties had intended that result when 
the covenants had been created, they would have made it clear. The covenant was restrictive 
and therefore the Lands Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with the application for modification. 
 
An example of a refusal by the Upper Tribunal to modify a leasehold covenant can be found 
in Phillips v Goddard.19 The application was made by a group of leaseholders of holiday chalets 
at a holiday park near Padstow in Cornwall. Each lease had been granted for 999 years and 
contained a restrictive covenant not to use the property for any purpose other than that of a 
holiday chalet and not to occupy or permit the property to be lived in or occupied between 2 
January and 28 or 29 February in each year, though the leaseholder could leave furniture and 
other effects in their holiday chalet during that period. The leaseholders sought a modification 
of the covenant to remove the prohibition on use and occupation during January and February. 
 
Planning permission had been obtained in 1974 for the holiday park. This was subject to a 
condition that the development should not be occupied from 2 January to 28 or 29 February in 
                                                 
15 See for example Re Blyth Corporation’s Application (1963) 14 P.&C.R. 56 and Westminster City Council v 
Duke of Westminster [1991] 4 All E.R. 136. 
16 Blumenthal v Church Commissioners for England [2004] EWCA Civ 1688. 
17 Founded in 1820, the Royal Society of Literature is the UK’s charity for the advancement of literature – see 
https://rsliterature.org. 
18 The functions of the Lands Tribunal were transferred to the Upper Tribunal in June 2009 by the Transfer of 
Tribunal Functions (Lands Tribunal and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2009 (SI 2009/1307). 
19 Phillips v Goddard [2011] UKUT 346 (LC). 
each year in order to ensure that the development was not used for permanent residential 
accommodation. In 2006 the landlord obtained a new planning permission for the development 
which removed the restriction on occupation during January and February. That prompted the 
leaseholders to apply for modification under s.84 in reliance on grounds (a), (aa) and (c). To 
support their application the leaseholders relied on: 
 an alleged failure to enforce the restrictive covenant;  
 the removal of the planning condition;  
 the fact that a new term for 12 months without the restriction had been offered; 
 the grant of a lease without such a restriction; 
 the fact that the leaseholders could not be excluded from the holiday park in January 
or February if they wished to carry out maintenance on their chalets; and 
 the fact that the landlord only carried out a small amount of maintenance work on the 
park during those months. 
 
The landlord’s responses to these were as follows: 
 the offers of new leases were conditional on a number of matters, including a minimum 
of a 50% take up, but they had not been greeted with enthusiasm by the leaseholders 
and the plan for new leases was aborted;  
 the one lease that had been granted without the occupation restriction had been granted 
by mistake;  
 additional office and administration expenses would be incurred if the chalets were 
occupied in January and February;  
 the landlord took their holidays during that period and would be prevented from doing 
so if the holiday park remained open for occupation; and 
 it would be very much more difficult for the landlord to carry out the essential repair 
and remedial work if the park was occupied in those months. 
 
The Upper Tribunal had regard to the fact that the landlord was the owner of the reversionary 
interest not only in the chalets which were the subject of the application, but of others that were 
not. The landlord had to maintain the common parts of the holiday park and had an interest in 
ensuring that they were well-maintained and that the park operated so that the value of new 
and future chalets could be maximised. Focusing on ground (aa) the Upper Tribunal held that 
the covenant still conferred practical benefits of substantial value to the landlord. A two-month 
shutdown enabled maintenance and improvement work to be carried out more economically 
and conveniently and allowed savings to be made in respect of staff and other running costs. 
In relation to ground (a), the Upper Tribunal held that the terms of the restrictive covenant still 
served a purpose that was capable of achievement. Its terms were wider than those of the 
restriction in the original planning permission. The benefits of a winter shutdown had not 
changed so it was not obsolete. Opposition under ground (c) failed because, for the reasons 
given under the other two grounds, the landlord would be injured by the modification sought. 
 
Finally, mention should be made of section 610 of the Housing Act 1985 which gives the court 
the power to authorise conversion of a house into flats. A local housing authority, or a person 
interested in any premises, can apply to the county court if  a conversion of the premises is 
prohibited by the provisions of the lease of the premises, a restrictive covenant or in any other 
way and either: 
 
 owing to changes in the character of the neighbourhood in which the premises are 
situated, they cannot readily be let as a single dwelling house but could readily be let 
for occupation if converted into two or more dwelling houses; or 
 planning permission has been granted under Part III of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 for the use of the premises as converted into two or more separate dwelling 
houses instead of as a single dwelling house. 
 
The court can vary the terms of the lease or other instrument imposing the prohibition or 
restriction, subject to conditions and on terms the court thinks just.20 In addition, the court must 
give any person interested in the application an opportunity of being heard. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The exercise of the court’s discretion was considered in Lawntown Ltd v Camenzuli [2007] EWCA Civ 949. 
